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SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW

PROVING RETALIATION AFTER BURLINGTON v. WHITE

INTRODUCTION
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 seeks to eradicate employment
discrimination by making two categories of employer conduct unlawful:
discrimination based on an individual’s race, color, religion, sex, or national
origin, and discrimination based on an individual’s efforts to enforce the Act’s
basic guarantees.1 Because enforcement of the Act depends on employees
reporting illegal practices, the protection of discrimination claimants is
crucial.2 Until recently, however, the level of protection varied across the
nation, as the circuits were split over what types of retaliatory conduct violated
Title VII. Some circuits applied the same standard to retaliation claims as to
underlying discrimination claims;3 some circuits limited actionable retaliatory
conduct to “ultimate employment decision[s];”4 and some held that employer
conduct was actionable if it would have dissuaded a reasonable employee from
making a discrimination claim.5 The need for a uniform standard increased,
and retaliation claims became more frequent after enactment of the Civil
Rights Act of 1991, which allowed plaintiffs suing under Title VII to seek
compensatory and punitive damages.6 Of the 75,428 discrimination charges
filed with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) in 2005,
25.8% were Title VII retaliation charges,7 up from 14.5% in 1992.8

1. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-2(a), 3(a) (2000); Burlington N. & Santa Fe Ry. Co. v. White
(Burlington), ____ U.S. ____ , 126 S. Ct. 2405, 2412 (2006).
2. See Burlington, 126 S. Ct. at 2414 (“[The] purpose of the anti-retaliation provision is to
ensure that employees are ‘completely free from coercion against reporting unlawful practices.”)
(citing NLRB v. Scrivener, 405 U.S. 117, 121–22 (1972)) (internal quotations omitted).
3. E.g., Von Gunten v. Maryland, 243 F.3d 858, 866 (4th Cir. 2001).
4. E.g., Manning v. Metro. Life Ins. Co., 127 F.3d 686, 692 (8th Cir. 1997).
5. E.g., Rochon v. Gonzales, 438 F.3d 1211, 1219 (D.C. Cir. 2006).
6. See 42 U.S.C. § 1981(a) (1991); PATRICIA A. WISE, UNDERSTANDING AND PREVENTING
WORKPLACE RETALIATION 1, 4 (2000) (attributing the increase in retaliation claims to the fact
that they “generally are easier to prove and result in larger damage awards than other
discrimination claims”).
7. EEOC, CHARGE STATISTICS: FY 1997 THROUGH FY 2006, available at
http://www.eeoc.gov/stats/charges.html.
8. EEOC, CHARGE STATISTICS: FY 1992 THROUGH FY 1996, available at
http://www.eeoc.gov/stats/charges-a.html.
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In June of 2006, the Supreme Court resolved the circuit split in Burlington
Northern & Santa Fe Railway Co. v. White and interpreted the statute broadly,
holding that the anti-retaliation provision of Title VII forbids any employer
action that would dissuade a reasonable employee from making a
discrimination claim, including actions unrelated to employment or the
workplace.9 In Burlington, railroad employee Sheila White claimed that she
was transferred from forklift operation to hard track labor and later suspended
without pay in retaliation for filing a sexual discrimination claim against her
supervisor.10 “[T]he date that they took me off that forklift and put me in the
yard to work with the mens [sic], I didn’t know the first thing about it. And
everything out there is hot and heavy. You could easily get killed or hurt out
there[,]” White said.11 And referring to her suspension, “[t]hat thirty-seven
days were the worst days I want to think of. Two children in school, and I was
the supporter, and no income coming in.”12 These details are important;
consideration of White’s particular circumstances is necessary to determine
whether her employer’s retaliatory conduct is actionable, according to the
Supreme Court.13 Writing for the majority, Justice Stephen Breyer stated that
the significance of the employer’s action depends on “the perspective of a
reasonable person in the plaintiff’s position.”14
In a separate concurrence, Justice Samuel Alito agreed with the majority in
the outcome of the case, that Burlington’s actions were unlawful retaliation,
but disagreed with the majority’s analysis and test for retaliation.15 Justice
Alito would limit the scope of unlawful retaliation to adverse employmentrelated actions,16 an interpretation more clearly supported by the statutory
language than the majority’s standard. Justice Alito argued that the antiretaliation provision of Title VII should be interpreted consistently with the
anti-discrimination provision, which is limited to preventing discrimination
with respect to employment.17 Furthermore, Justice Alito believed that the
majority’s standard of a reasonable person in the plaintiff’s position will be
difficult for courts to apply because it requires consideration of employees’
individual characteristics, but does not specify which characteristics courts

9. Burlington, ___ U.S. ___, 126 S. Ct. 2405, 2409 (2006).
10. Id. at 2409–10.
11. Shaila Dewan, Forklift Driver’s Stand Leads to Broad Rule Protecting Workers Who
Fear Retaliation, N.Y. TIMES, June 24, 2006, at A1.
12. Morning Edition: Supreme Court Sides with Worker in Retaliation Suit (NPR radio
broadcast June 23, 2006), available at http://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?story
Id=5505828.
13. Burlington, 126 S. Ct. at 2415.
14. Id. at 2416.
15. Id. at 2422 (Alito, J., concurring).
16. Id.
17. Id. at 2419–21.
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must consider.18 Justice Alito would instead apply the standard used by the
Sixth Circuit below, which found that White’s reassignment and suspension
were materially adverse employment actions and thus prohibited under Title
VII.19
This Note argues that the majority’s test for retaliation will in fact prove
unworkable, as Justice Alito suggested, and that the Sixth Circuit’s standard is
a more equitable and reasonable interpretation of Title VII and the antiretaliation provision. Part II provides an overview of Title VII and its main
provisions, with discussion of the elements necessary to establish
discrimination and retaliation claims. That section also describes the circuit
split and the competing retaliation standards. Part III describes Burlington
Northern v. White in detail, discussing the facts of the case, the two Sixth
Circuit decisions, the Supreme Court’s ultimate holdings in the case, and
Justice Alito’s concurrence. Part IV provides an analysis of the majority’s
standard for retaliation and suggests that Justice Alito’s interpretation of
retaliation under Title VII is more consistent with the language and purpose of
the statute. That section also discusses the difficulties courts are likely to have
in applying the majority’s standard and the practical problems the new
standard will cause employers and, eventually, employees. Part V concludes
that the standard for retaliation under Title VII should be the same objective
standard used in discrimination cases, that this standard strikes the appropriate
balance between the rights of employers and employees, and that this standard
will be effective in securing individual civil rights under Title VII.
I. TITLE VII AND THE CIRCUIT SPLIT
A.

Overview of Title VII

The Civil Rights Act of 1964 was enacted primarily to eliminate
discrimination in public accommodations, public education, and employment,
at a time when racial discrimination was the “[m]ost glaring.”20 Congress did
not intend for the Act to breed litigation, but instead sought to encourage
voluntary resolution of all but the most serious types of discrimination.21
Accordingly, Title VII’s primary purpose “is not to provide redress but to
avoid harm”22 through a system of formal and informal remedial procedures
implemented by the EEOC.23 For example, the EEOC encourages employers

18. Burlington, 126 S. Ct. at 2421.
19. Id. at 2422.
20. See H.R. REP. NO. 88-914 (1963), reprinted in 1964 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2391, 2393–94; Civil
Rights Act of 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-352, 78 Stat. 241, 241–68 (1964).
21. H.R. REP. NO. 88-914.
22. Faragher v. City of Boca Raton, 524 U.S. 775, 806 (1998).
23. H.R. REP. NO. 88-914, reprinted in 1964 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 2401.
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to establish an internal complaint procedure for discrimination complaints
which, if effective, can limit employer liability.24 The Supreme Court has
affirmed this preventative approach as consistent with Title VII’s purpose,
stating that employers deserve credit for making “reasonable efforts to
discharge their duty” to prevent and remedy discriminatory conduct.25
Victims of discrimination must first file a complaint with the EEOC, which
investigates claims and has the power to enjoin the employer from unlawful
practices.26 If the EEOC does not take action on a complaint within a certain
period of time, the complaining party can bring a civil action against the
employer.27
Title VII defines unlawful employment discrimination in two sections.
Section 703(a) of the Act makes it unlawful for an employer
(1) to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any individual, or otherwise to
discriminate against any individual with respect to his compensation, terms,
conditions, or privileges of employment, because of such individual’s race,
color, religion, sex, or national origin; or
(2) to limit, segregate, or classify his employees or applicants for employment
in any way which would deprive or tend to deprive any individual of
employment opportunities or otherwise adversely affect his status as an
employee, because of such individual’s race, color, religion, sex, or national
28
origin.

The Supreme Court in Burlington referred to this section as Title VII’s
“substantive anti-discrimination provision.”29
This provision prohibits
“disparate treatment” of a protected class and also conduct that may be facially
neutral but has a “disparate impact” on protected individuals equivalent to
intentional discrimination.30 To recover under a disparate treatment theory, the
plaintiff must establish a discriminatory motive underlying the employer’s
action; disparate impact claims, however, do not require proof of a
discriminatory motive.31
For a plaintiff to recover for disparate treatment, the challenged employer
conduct must be either a tangible employment action resulting in a significant
change in employment status or benefits,32 or must be harassment so severe

24. See, e.g., EEOC Policy Guidance on Sexual Harassment, No. N-915-050 (Mar. 19,
1990), available at http://www.eeoc.gov/policy/docs/currentissues.html.
25. Faragher, 524 U.S. at 806.
26. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5 (2000).
27. Id.
28. Id. § 2000e-2(a).
29. Burlington, ____ U.S. ____ , 126 S. Ct. 2405, 2411 (2006).
30. See, e.g., Watson v. Fort Worth Bank & Trust, 487 U.S. 977, 986–87 (1988).
31. Id. at 986.
32. Burlington Indus., Inc. v. Ellerth (Ellerth), 524 U.S. 742, 761 (1998).
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that it effectively alters the conditions of plaintiff’s employment and creates an
abusive or “hostile working environment.”33
Section 704(a) of Title VII, the “anti-retaliation provision,”34 makes it
unlawful for an employer “to discriminate against any of his employees . . .
because he has opposed any practice made an unlawful employment practice
by this subchapter, or because he has . . . participated in any manner in an
investigation, proceeding, or hearing under this subchapter.”35 To establish a
prima facie case of retaliation, the plaintiff must show participation in an
activity protected by Title VII, employer conduct adversely affecting the
plaintiff, and a causal link between the protected activity and the employer
conduct.36 Plaintiffs do not need to prove the underlying discrimination claim
to successfully claim retaliation; they need only a reasonable belief that
discrimination occurred.37 In addition, section 704(a) protects all individuals
who oppose discriminatory practices, whether they participate in formal or in
informal proceedings,38 and whether or not they are a member of a protected
class.39
Under both sections 703(a) and 704(a), if the plaintiff has no direct
evidence of discrimination, she may present circumstantial evidence according
to the burden shifting rules applied by the Supreme Court in McDonnell
Douglas v. Green,40 a disparate treatment case.41 The plaintiff has the initial
burden of establishing a prima facie case of discrimination or retaliation; the
burden then shifts to the employer to show a legitimate justification for the
challenged conduct; the burden then returns to the plaintiff to show that the
33. Meritor Sav. Bank, FSB v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 64 (1986).
34. Burlington, 126 S. Ct. at 2411.
35. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3(a) (2000).
36. See, e.g., White v. Burlington N. & Santa Fe R. Co. (White II), 364 F.3d 789, 796 (6th
Cir. 2004).
37. Jackson v. Birmingham Bd. of Educ., 544 U.S. 167, 187–88 (2005); Crumpacker v. Kan.
Dept. of Human Res., 338 F.3d 1163, 1171 & n.5 (10th Cir. 2003) (“[A]n actual violation is not
required to maintain a retaliation claim under Title VII.”) (emphasis in original).
38. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3(a); EEOC v. Hacienda Hotel, 881 F.2d 1504, 1514 (9th Cir. 1989)
(making an informal complaint to supervisor is a protected activity); see also Deborah L. Brake,
Retaliation, 90 MINN. L. REV. 18, 77–78 (2005) (noting that without protection from retaliation at
less formal stages, complainants could be discouraged from reporting altogether or forced into
taking formal legal action).
39. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3(a); Ray v. Henderson, 217 F.3d 1234, 1240 n.3 (9th Cir. 2000)
(making a complaint about treatment of others is a protected activity even when the employee is
not a member of the protected class).
40. See McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802 (1973).
41. See, e.g., Che v. Mass. Bay Transp. Auth., 342 F.3d 31, 38 (1st Cir. 2003) (applying
McDonnell Douglas burden shifting rules to retaliation cases); see also Kari Jahnke, Protecting
Employees from Employees: Applying Title VII’s Anti-Retaliation Provision to Coworker
Harassment, 19 LAW & INEQ. 101, 103–05 (2001) (discussing the burden shifting in retaliation
cases).

SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW

1226

SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 52:1221

employer’s justification is a pretext to conceal a discriminatory or retaliatory
motive.42
Both section 703(a) and section 704(a) make it unlawful for employers to
“discriminate against” individuals, whether on the basis of their status or their
participation in a protected activity.43 The term “discriminate against” is used
throughout Title VII but not defined in the statute,44 although courts agree
generally that it refers to some distinction or difference that harms protected
individuals.45 Section 703(a), however, explicitly prohibits discrimination with
respect to the “compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of
employment,”46 while section 704(a) does not specify what type of
discrimination or conduct constitutes unlawful retaliation.47 In addition, the
Supreme Court has further clarified the meaning of discrimination under
section 703(a) with concepts such as disparate treatment, hostile work
environment, and tangible employment action.48 However, until Burlington,
the Court did not establish comparable precedent in the law of retaliation, nor
indicate whether substantive discrimination concepts also applied under
section 704(a).49 Because of the lack of Supreme Court precedent and the
ambiguous language of the statute, the federal courts of appeals developed
conflicting interpretations of Title VII’s anti-retaliation provision.
B.

The Circuit Split

Even before Burlington, the circuits agreed on the elements necessary to
establish a prima facie case of retaliation under Title VII, as stated above:
plaintiff’s participation in a protected activity, employer conduct adverse to the
plaintiff, and a causal link between the protected activity and the employer

42. See McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. at 802–805.
43. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-2(a)(1), 3(a).
44. See id. § 2000e.
45. See Burlington, ____ U.S. ____ , 126 S. Ct. 2405, 2410 (2006) (citing, inter alia, Jackson
v. Birmingham Bd. Of Educ., 544 U.S. 167 (2005), and 4 OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY 758
(2d ed. 1989)).
46. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1).
47. See id. § 2000e-3(a).
48. See supra notes 25, 30, 32–33 and accompanying text.
49. Cathy Currie, Staying on the Straighter and Narrower: A Criticism of the Court’s
Definition of Adverse Employment Action Under the Retaliation Provision of Title VII, 43 S. TEX.
L. REV. 1323, 1325–28 (2002) (discussing the application of § 703(a) concepts to § 704(a)
claims); Linda M. Glover, Title VII Section 704(a) Retaliation Claims: Turning a Blind Eye
Towards Justice, 38 HOUS. L. REV. 577, 610 (2001) (discussing the lack of Supreme Court
precedent on retaliation).
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conduct.50 The circuits disagreed, however, over what types of retaliatory
conduct were actionable, and three basic standards developed.
The First, Seventh, Ninth, Tenth, Eleventh, and D.C. Circuits applied the
broadest standard and interpreted Title VII to prohibit any adverse treatment
based on a retaliatory motive that was reasonably likely to deter an employee
from engaging in protected activity.51 This standard encompasses any negative
evaluation or reference, any change in duties, schedule, pay, or benefits,52 and
any transfer to a “more unfriendly working environment.”53 In addition,
hostility from coworkers in response to an employee’s discrimination charge
can constitute unlawful retaliation.54 Under this approach, an employer is
liable for a retaliatory personnel action even if it is ultimately inconsequential;
the severity of the act “goes to the issue of damages, not liability.”55 This
standard is consistent with EEOC guidelines, which state that an adverse action
does not need to be an “ultimate employment action,” such as a discharge, or
even be related to employment to qualify as unlawful retaliation.56 The
Supreme Court ultimately adopted a version of this standard in Burlington.57
The Fifth and the Eighth Circuits applied the most restrictive standard and
limited actionable retaliation to “ultimate employment decisions” involving
hiring, firing, demoting, or a loss in wages or benefits.58 Under this standard,
an employee suffering a retaliatory “intermediate employment action,” such as
a suspension or a negative evaluation, cannot recover unless the action resulted
in a final employment decision, such as the denial of a promotion.59 These
circuits interpreted Title VII’s substantive anti-discrimination provision more

50. See, e.g., Smith v. City of Salem, 378 F.3d 566, 570 (6th Cir. 2004); Roberson v. Alltel
Info. Servs., 373 F.3d 647, 655 (5th Cir. 2004); Feingold v. New York, 366 F.3d 138, 156 (2d
Cir. 2004); Rhodes v. Ill. Dept. of Transp., 359 F.3d 498, 504 (7th Cir. 2004).
51. See Ray v. Henderson, 217 F.3d 1234, 1240–43 (9th Cir. 2000) (stating the standard and
describing the circuit split); see also Rochon v. Gonzales, 438 F.3d 1211, 1213 (D.C. Cir. 2006);
Noviello v. City of Boston, 398 F.3d 76, 89–90 (1st Cir. 2005); Jeffries v. Kansas, 147 F.3d 1220,
1232–33 (10th Cir. 1998); Wideman v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 141 F.3d 1453, 1456 (11th Cir.
1998); Knox v. Indiana, 93 F.3d 1327, 1334 (7th Cir. 1996).
52. Ray, 217 F.3d at 1243; Knox, 93 F.3d at 1334.
53. Knox, 93 F.3d at 1334.
54. E.g., Hashimoto v. Dalton, 118 F.3d 671, 676 (9th Cir. 1997).
55. Id.
56. EEOC, 2 EEOC COMPLIANCE MANUAL, SECTION 8: RETALIATION 8–13 (1998),
available at http://www.eeoc.gov/policy/docs/retal.html [hereinafter EEOC COMPLIANCE
MANUAL].
57. Burlington, ___ U.S.___, 126 S. Ct. 2405, 2409 (2006).
58. E.g., Manning v. Metro. Life Ins. Co., 127 F.3d 686, 692 (8th Cir. 1997); Mattern v.
Eastman Kodak Co., 104 F.3d 702, 707 (5th Cir. 1997).
59. See Okruhlik v. Univ. of Ark., 395 F.3d 872, 880–81 (8th Cir. 2005) (plaintiff’s failure
to appeal negative evaluation served as a withdrawal from the tenure-review process and
therefore denial of tenure was not an ultimate employment decision).
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broadly than the anti-retaliation provision; because section 704(a) refers only
to “discrimination” and does not mention the specific harms listed in section
703(a), it “can only be read to exclude such vague harms, and to include only
ultimate employment decisions.”60 For a hostile work environment to qualify
as an ultimate employment decision, the plaintiff must claim that conditions
were so abusive that he was constructively discharged.61 The Sixth Circuit
applied a version of the “ultimate employment decision” standard in its first
decision in White v. Burlington Northern.62
The Second, Third, and Fourth Circuits took the most moderate approach
and applied the same standard to retaliation claims as to substantive
discrimination claims.63 These circuits interpreted section 704(a) consistently
with 703(a) and required discrimination plaintiffs under both sections to show
an adverse action related to the “compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges
of employment.”64 This standard is not limited to ultimate employment
decisions, but covers any type of adverse action affecting employment.65 The
“adverse employment action” element incorporates the section 703(a)
“tangible employment action” precedent;66 retaliatory conduct and
discriminatory conduct must meet the same test for materiality.67 This
standard likewise incorporates hostile work environment precedent,68 and thus
“unchecked retaliatory co-worker harassment, if sufficiently severe, may
constitute adverse employment action.”69 Sitting en banc, the Sixth Circuit
applied this standard in White v. Burlington Northern.70
Each of these three standards was applied to Sheila White’s claims against
Burlington: The Sixth Circuit initially applied the “ultimate employment
decision” test, and then, sitting en banc, applied the “adverse employment
action” test; the Supreme Court resolved the case by finding that Burlington’s
actions were likely to deter an employee from making a discrimination
charge.71 The following discussion of the two Sixth Circuit decisions and the
Supreme Court’s resolution in Burlington Northern & Santa Fe Railway Co. v.
60. Mattern, 104 F.3d at 709.
61. See id. (“Hostility from fellow employees, having tools stolen, and resulting anxiety,
without more, do not constitute ultimate employment decisions.”).
62. White v. Burlington N. & Santa Fe Ry. Co. (White I), 310 F.3d 443, 446 (6th Cir. 2002).
63. See, e.g., Von Gunten v. Maryland, 243 F.3d 858, 865 (4th Cir. 2001); Richardson v.
N.Y. State Dep’t of Corr. Servs., 180 F.3d 426, 446 (2d Cir. 1999); Robinson v. City of
Pittsburgh, 120 F.3d 1286, 1300–01 (3d Cir. 1997).
64. Robinson, 120 F.3d at 1300–01.
65. Von Gunten, 243 F.3d at 865.
66. See supra note 32 and accompanying text.
67. Robinson, 120 F.3d at 1300–01.
68. See supra note 34 and accompanying text.
69. Richardson v. N.Y. State Dep’t of Corr. Servs., 180 F.3d 426, 446 (2d Cir. 1999).
70. White I, 364 F.3d 789, 795–96 (6th Cir. 2004) (en banc).
71. See generally infra Part II.
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White outlines the reasoning of each standard and exhibits each in practice as it
applied to the facts of Burlington.
II. BURLINGTON NORTHERN & SANTA FE RAILWAY COMPANY V. WHITE
A.

Facts

In June of 1997, Sheila White began working at Burlington Railroad as a
forklift operator and as the only woman in the Maintenance of Way
Department at Burlington’s Tennessee Yard.72 In September, 1997, White
reported to Burlington officials that her supervisor, Bill Joiner, repeatedly
expressed his belief that women should not work in the Maintenance of Way
Department and insulted White in front of her coworkers.73 After an
investigation, Burlington suspended Joiner and required him to attend sexual
harassment training.74 After Joiner was suspended, Burlington’s roadmaster,
Marvin Brown, removed White from forklift duty and reassigned her to more
arduous work as a track laborer.75 Brown told her the transfer was in response
to complaints that an employee with more seniority than White was entitled to
the forklift position.76
White then filed a complaint with the EEOC, claiming that the
reassignment was gender-based discrimination and retaliation for her
complaint about Joiner.77 A few months later, White filed a second complaint
with the EEOC, claiming that Brown had placed her under surveillance in
retaliation for her charges.78 A few days after Brown received notice of this
second complaint, White’s supervisor reported that she had been insubordinate,
and Brown immediately suspended White without pay.79 White then filed a
grievance with Burlington appealing her suspension and also a third retaliation
complaint with the EEOC.80
While the grievance was pending over the Christmas holiday season,
White had no job, no income, and no guarantee that she would ever be able to
return to work.81 She received treatment for emotional distress during this time
period and incurred medical expenses.82 After an investigation, Burlington
concluded that White had not been insubordinate and should not have been
72.
73.
74.
75.
76.
77.
78.
79.
80.
81.
82.

Burlington, ___ U.S. ___, 126 S. Ct. 2405, 2409 (2006).
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Burlington, 126 S. Ct. at 2409.
Id.
Id.
White II, 364 F.3d 789, 794 (6th Cir. 2004) (en banc).
Id.
Id.
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suspended.83 On January 16, 1998, White was reinstated to her position and
awarded full backpay for her thirty-seven day suspension.84 Having exhausted
administrative remedies with the EEOC, White filed a complaint against
Burlington in United States District Court, alleging gender-based
discrimination and retaliation under Title VII.85
In 2000, the case went to trial, and the jury found that Burlington was not
liable on the discrimination claim but was liable for unlawful retaliation.86 The
jury awarded White $43,500 in compensatory damages, including her medical
After the verdict, Burlington
expenses, but no punitive damages.87
unsuccessfully moved for judgment as a matter of law, or in the alternative, for
a new trial.88 After its motion was denied, Burlington appealed to the Sixth
Circuit.89
B.

The First Sixth Circuit Decision

On appeal, Burlington claimed that White had failed to state a claim for
retaliation because neither her job reassignment nor her temporary suspension
was an adverse employment action under Title VII.90 Burlington asserted that
removal from forklift duty did not disadvantage White; she was hired as a
general track maintenance worker and maintained that position while operating
the forklift and while performing the more physically demanding duties.91
Burlington then argued that because White’s suspension was temporary, it was
not a “final employment decision” and so not an actionable adverse
employment action.92 Furthermore, Burlington noted that the suspension did
not result in any permanent economic harm because White was reinstated to
her position with full backpay and benefits.93
The Sixth Circuit agreed with Burlington, finding that neither White’s
reassignment nor her suspension was an adverse employment action sufficient
to support a retaliation claim under Title VII.94 In reaching its conclusion, the
court relied on Sixth Circuit cases that required retaliation plaintiffs to show “a
materially adverse change in the terms and conditions of . . . employment”95

83.
84.
85.
86.
87.
88.
89.
90.
91.
92.
93.
94.
95.

Id.
Id.
White II, 364 F.3d at 794.
Id.
Id.
White I, 310 F.3d 443, 446 (6th Cir. 2002).
Id.
Id. at 449.
Id. at 451.
Id. at 452.
White I, 310 F.3d at 452.
Id. at 455.
Id. at 450.
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The court defined a “material adverse change” basically as an ultimate
employment decision, such as a termination of employment, a demotion, a loss
of wages or benefits, or other such “disruptive” changes in employment
Unlike these types of employment decisions, lateral
conditions.96
reassignments like White’s, without changes in pay or work hours, were
generally not actionable.97
In support of this argument, the court cited Darnell v. Campbell County
Fiscal Court in which an employee was transferred to a job with the same
rank, duties, and pay, but required to commute an additional twenty minutes
each way; this transfer was not an employment decision sufficient to constitute
actionable retaliation.98 The court also cited similar cases from the Fifth and
Eighth Circuits which held that a transfer to a job with poor working
conditions,99 a transfer to a job perceived as less desirable by the employee,100
and a transfer to a more stressful job101 were all insufficient to satisfy the
adverse employment action element of a retaliation claim.102 The court also
cited Murphy v. Yellow Freight System, Inc.,103 which held there was no
adverse employment action where a female employee received less than her
expected pay raise, was placed on night and weekend shifts, and complained
that her supervisor placed his notes of their conversations in her personnel
file.104 Relying on this precedent, the court concluded that reassigning White
from forklift operation to more physically demanding work was not a
“materially adverse change” in the conditions of employment.105
Likewise, the court also found that White’s suspension was not an adverse
employment action.106 In holding that White’s suspension was not actionable,
the court relied primarily on Dobbs-Weinstein v. Vanderbilt University,107
which concerned a professor’s claim that she was denied tenure at Vanderbilt
After Vanderbilt conducted an internal
for discriminatory reasons.108
investigation, the plaintiff was granted tenure and also received full backpay as
of the date she should have been granted tenure.109 Despite this relief, the
96. Id.
97. Id.
98. White I, 310 F.3d at 450 (citing Darnell v. Campbell Cty. Fiscal Court, 924 F.2d 1057
(6th Cir. 1991) (unpublished table decision)).
99. Bradford v. Norfolk S. Corp., 54 F.3d 1412, 1420 (8th Cir. 1995).
100. Kelleher v. Flawn, 761 F.2d 1079, 1086 (5th Cir. 1985).
101. Harlston v. McDonnell Douglas Corp., 37 F.3d 379, 382 (8th Cir. 1994).
102. White I, 310 F.3d at 450.
103. 832 F. Supp. 1543 (N.D. Ga. 1993).
104. White I, 310 F.3d at 450 (citing Murphy, 832 F. Supp. at 1550–51).
105. Id. at 451.
106. Id. at 453.
107. 185 F.3d 542 (6th Cir. 1999).
108. White I, 310 F.3d at 452 (citing Dobbs-Weinstein, 185 F.3d at 544).
109. Dobbs-Weinstein, 185 F.3d at 544.
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plaintiff sued Vanderbilt under Title VII for emotional distress, damage to her
reputation, and interest on the backpay.110 The Sixth Circuit held that the
initial wrongful denial of tenure was not a final adverse employment decision
because the plaintiff ultimately received tenure with backpay.111 The court
stated:
She has not here suffered a final or lasting adverse employment action
sufficient to create a prima facie case of employment discrimination under
Title VII. To rule otherwise would be to encourage litigation before the
employer has an opportunity to correct through internal grievance procedures
any wrong it may have committed.112
The court held that, like the professor in Dobbs-Weinstein, White suffered
no materially adverse employment action with respect to her suspension
because she was ultimately reinstated with backpay.113 The court rejected
White’s claim that she endured unique hardships because her suspension
occurred during the holiday season, stating that “[w]hile emotional injuries
may be affected by the season, it does not make the suspension a sufficiently
adverse employment action.”114 The court thus concluded that because neither
White’s lateral job transfer nor her temporary suspension were adverse
employment actions within the meaning of Title VII, White had failed to make
a prima facie case for retaliation.115 The court reversed the trial court’s
decision and set aside the jury verdict in favor of White.116 White then
successfully petitioned the Sixth Circuit for a rehearing.117
C. The Sixth Circuit En Banc Decision
On rehearing, the Sixth Circuit, sitting en banc, readdressed the scope of
the anti-retaliation provision and found that both White’s reassignment to more
difficult work and her suspension were adverse employment actions in
violation of Title VII.118 The court refused, however, to revise its definition of
adverse employment action and adopt the standard of the EEOC, which filed
an amicus curiae brief on White’s behalf.119 The EEOC Guidelines interpret
Title VII as prohibiting “any adverse treatment that is based on a retaliatory
motive and is reasonably likely to deter a charging party or others from

110.
111.
112.
113.
114.
115.
116.
117.
118.
119.

Id.
Id. at 545.
White I, 310 F.3d at 453 (quoting Dobbs-Weinstein, 185 F.3d at 546).
Id. at 454–55.
Id. at 453.
Id. at 455.
Id.
See White II, 364 F.3d 789, 791 (6th Cir. 2004) (en banc).
Id. at 801–03.
Id. at 798, 800.
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engaging in a protected activity.”120 The EEOC argued that this broad
definition is supported by the language of Title VII; unlike the antidiscrimination provision, the anti-retaliation provision contains no language
restricting its coverage to significant employment decisions.121 The court
disagreed, finding that such a literal reading of Title VII would authorize
claims based on “petty slights and trivial annoyances.”122 The court held that
not all employment discrimination is actionable; plaintiffs must show an
“adverse” or “tangible” employment action beyond “trivial workplace
dissatisfactions.”123 The court then discussed precedent in which it developed
the adverse employment action element to prevent such trivial claims.124
The court cited Geisler v. Folsom125 as the first Sixth Circuit case holding
that Title VII’s anti-retaliation provision required proof of an “adverse
employment action.”126 In Geisler, the plaintiff claimed that the increased
workplace tension that arose after she filed a sex discrimination charge
amounted to unlawful retaliation.127 Although the court found that Geisler’s
claim was too general, it held that such increases in tension could be evidence
of adverse employment action and that “any discrete act or course of conduct
which could be construed as retaliation must be examined carefully.”128
The court then cited Kocsis v. Multi-Care Management, Inc.129 as the
primary case that developed the Sixth Circuit’s definition of an adverse
employment action.130 In Kocsis, the plaintiff claimed she was transferred
from her position as nursing supervisor to a “unit nurse” position for
discriminatory reasons.131 Although her salary and benefits were unaffected,
the plaintiff claimed she suffered an adverse employment action because her
patient-care duties as a unit nurse were much more physically demanding than
her supervisor duties.132 The court disagreed, holding that a change in job
duties without a change in salary or work hours does not usually qualify as a
materially adverse employment action.133 The court also held, however, that
such a lateral job transfer may be actionable if it corresponds to “a less

120.
121.
122.
123.
124.
125.
126.
127.
128.
129.
130.
131.
132.
133.

Id. at 798 (quoting EEOC COMPLIANCE MANUAL, supra note 56, at 8–13).
Id.
White II, 364 F.3d 789, 799 (6th Cir. 2004) (en banc) (internal quotation omitted).
Id. at 795.
Id.
735 F.2d 991 (6th Cir. 1984).
White II, 364 F.3d at 796.
Geisler, 735 F.2d at 993.
Id. at 996.
97 F.3d 876 (6th Cir. 1996).
White II, 364 F.3d at 797.
Kocsis, 97 F.3d at 879, 880.
Id. at 880.
Id. at 885 (citing Yates v. Avco Corp., 819 F.2d 630, 638 (6th Cir. 1987)).
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distinguished title, a material loss of benefits, significantly diminished material
responsibilities, or other indices that might be unique to a particular
situation.”134 The Supreme Court cited Kocsis in its landmark discrimination
case, Burlington Industries, Inc. v. Ellerth,135 when it held that an adverse
employment action involves a significant change in employment conditions,
such as a demotion or a substantial change in duties.136
Sitting en banc, the Sixth Circuit in White affirmed the definition of
adverse employment action developed in Kocsis and Ellerth and held that
plaintiffs must show such an action under Title VII’s anti-retaliation
provision.137 In doing so, the court incorporated the concept of “tangible
employment action” developed under the anti-discrimination provision and
interpreted both sections to require a material change in the conditions of
employment.138 The court thus rejected the EEOC’s argument that any type of
retaliatory conduct is actionable, stating that requiring plaintiffs to show a
tangible employment action accomplishes the statute’s purpose while
preventing trivial lawsuits.139 The court also rejected the Dobbs-Weinstein
requirement of an ultimate employment decision.140 The court believed instead
that the phrase “discriminate against” should be given the same meaning each
time it appears in the statute, and thus that the adverse employment action
requirement applied equally to all Title VII discrimination and retaliation
claims.141
The court then applied its standard to the facts of White, first finding that
White’s thirty-seven day suspension without pay was an adverse employment
action, not a trivial employment action causing a “mere inconvenience” or
“bruised ego.”142 The court also held that reinstatement with backpay did not
make White whole; she was entitled to interest, attorneys’ fees, and damages
for emotional suffering.143 The court then found that White’s reassignment to
hard track labor was a demotion evidenced by the circumstances: the forklift
position required more qualifications, the track labor was much more arduous,
and Burlington employees considered forklift operation a more desirable
position.144 The court held that such a demotion was a material change in

134.
135.
136.
137.
138.
139.
140.
141.
142.
143.
144.

Id. at 886.
524 U.S. 742 (1998).
Id. at 762.
White II, 364 F.3d 789, 800 (6th Cir. 2004) (en banc).
See id. at 798–800.
Id. at 799.
Id. at 801 & n. 7.
Id. at 799.
White II, 364 F.3d at 802 (citing Kocsis, 97 F.3d 876, 886 (6th Cir. 1996)).
Id.
Id. at 803.
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employment conditions and unlawful retaliatory conduct.145 The court thus
concluded that a jury could reasonably have found that both White’s
suspension and reassignment were adverse employment actions in violation of
Title VII,146 and it affirmed the district court’s denial of Burlington’s motion
for judgment as a matter of law.147 Burlington then petitioned the Supreme
Court for certiorari, asking the Court to resolve the circuit split and determine
which interpretation of Title VII governs retaliation claims.148
D. The Supreme Court’s Majority Opinion
The Supreme Court granted certiorari to decide two issues: whether Title
VII requires a link between retaliatory conduct and employment and how
harmful the conduct must be to constitute actionable retaliation.149 After
examining the competing interpretations in the circuits, Justice Breyer, writing
for the majority, concluded that Title VII’s anti-retaliation provision is not
limited to workplace conduct and that it prohibits all conduct serious enough to
dissuade a reasonable worker from making a discrimination charge.150
The Court first rejected the standard, applied by the Sixth Circuit below,
requiring retaliation plaintiffs to show a materially adverse employment
action.151 The Court refused to read section 704(a), Title VII’s anti-retaliation
provision, in conjunction with section 703(a), the anti-discrimination
provision, and thus limited conduct affecting the terms, conditions, or status of
employment.152 The Court stated that Congress intended to omit that language
from section 704 because the provisions serve different purposes: section 703
prevents discrimination based on an individual’s status, while section 704
protects certain conduct.153 The Court found that section 704’s purpose could
not be achieved by limiting its protection to the workplace because retaliatory
conduct can cause harm outside the workplace.154 In support of this argument,
the Court cited Rochon v. Gonzales, in which the FBI retaliated by refusing to
investigate death threats against an employee,155 and Berry v. Stevinson

145. Id. at 804 (noting that the court had rejected Burlington Northern’s argument that no
adverse employment action was taken).
146. Id. at 804.
147. White II, 364 F.3d at 804, 808.
148. Petition for Writ of Certiorari, Burlington, 126 S. Ct. 2405 (2006) (No. 05-259), 2005
WL 2055901.
149. Burlington, ___ U.S. ___, 126 S. Ct. 2405, 2411 (2006).
150. Id. at 2410–11, 2414–15.
151. Id. at 2410, 2411.
152. Id. at 2411.
153. Id. at 2412.
154. Burlington, 126 S. Ct. at 2412.
155. Rochon v. Gonzales, 438 F.3d 1211, 1213 (D.C. Cir. 2006).
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Chevrolet,156 in which an employer retaliated by filing false criminal charges
against an employee.157
The Court rejected Burlington’s argument that it is “anomalous” to extend
more protection to the victims of retaliation than to victims of discrimination,
pointing again to the different purposes of section 703(a) and section 704(a).158
Without examining the objectives of the anti-discrimination provision, the
Court stated that section 704 protection must extend beyond employmentrelated retaliation so that employees will be willing to report unlawful
practices.159 Thus, the Court rejected the retaliation standards applied by
circuits requiring an adverse employment action, as well as those requiring
“ultimate employment decisions.”160
The Court conceded, however, that not all retaliation is actionable under
Title VII and that the judicial standard must filter out trivial complaints.161 In
concurrence with the Seventh and District of Columbia Circuits, the Court held
that plaintiffs must show a “materially adverse” action, defined as conduct that
“well might have dissuaded a reasonable worker from making or supporting a
charge of discrimination.”162 This standard will be sufficient to prevent Title
VII from becoming a “general civility code for the American workplace”163
because “normally petty slights, minor annoyances, and simple lack of good
manners will not create such deterrence.”164
The Court emphasized the importance of the objective, “reasonable
employee” standard for retaliation that avoids judicial inquiry into “a
plaintiff’s unusual subjective feelings.”165 The Court explained, however, that
the standard actually refers to a reasonable employee in the plaintiff’s position;
in fact, whether retaliatory conduct is actionable depends on the unique
“circumstances, expectations, and relationships which are not fully captured by
a simple recitation of the words used or the physical acts performed.”166 The
Court gave several examples of this variable “reasonable employee” standard:
A schedule change may have a trivial impact on many workers, but will
constitute retaliation against a “young mother with school age children”; a
supervisor’s refusal to invite an employee to lunch is usually a “petty slight,”
but exclusion from a weekly training lunch is actionable retaliation; the

156.
157.
158.
159.
160.
161.
162.
163.
164.
165.
166.

74 F.3d 980, 984, 986 (10th Cir. 1996).
Burlington, 126 S. Ct. at 2412.
Id. at 2414.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 2415.
Burlington, 126 S. Ct. at 2415 (internal citations omitted).
Id. (quoting Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Servs., Inc., 523 U.S. 75, 80 (1998)).
Id.
Id. (emphasis in original).
Id. (quoting Oncale, 523 U.S. at 81–82).
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average employee who is denied flexible hours after making a discrimination
charge may not have a remedy, but an employee who needed the flexible
schedule to care for a disabled child can file a retaliation claim.167
Applying this standard to White’s retaliation claim, the Court found that
both of Burlington’s challenged actions were “materially adverse” to White
and therefore prohibited under Title VII.168 The Court first found that the
reassignment to the less desirable track laborer position was “one good way to
discourage an employee such as White from bringing discrimination charges,”
pointing to the same facts the Sixth Circuit considered in finding that the
transfer was a demotion.169 In finding that White’s suspension was also a
materially adverse action, the Court, like the Sixth Circuit, recognized the
significance of living thirty-seven days without income and the failure of
backpay to make White whole.170 The Supreme Court, however, also found it
relevant that White supported a family and that the suspension took place over
the holidays; the Court quoted her testimony: “That was the worst Christmas I
had out of my life.”171 Although it applied a much broader standard, the
Supreme Court, like the Sixth Circuit, found sufficient evidence of retaliation
and concluded that the jury verdict in favor of White should be upheld.172
E.

Justice Alito’s Concurrence

Justice Alito wrote a separate opinion concurring in the judgment.173
While he agreed with the majority that both White’s reassignment and her
suspension were unlawful retaliation, Justice Alito disagreed with the
He believed the majority’s
majority’s interpretation of Title VII.174
interpretation was inconsistent with the statutory language and feared that its
application will cause practical problems.175
1.

The Textual Argument

Justice Alito began by quoting sections 703(a) and 704(a),176 emphasizing
the language in section 703(a)(1) which makes it unlawful for employers to
discharge, fail to hire, or “otherwise to discriminate against any individual
with respect to his compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of

167.
168.
169.
170.
171.
172.
173.
174.
175.
176.

See Burlington, 126 S. Ct. at 2415–16.
Id. at 2416.
Id. at 2416–17; supra note 144 and accompanying text.
See Burlington, 126 S. Ct. at 2417; supra notes 142–43 and accompanying text.
See Burlington, 126 S. Ct. at 2417.
Id. at 2416; supra note 145 and accompanying text.
Burlington, 126 S. Ct. at 2418–22 (Alito, J., concurring).
Id. at 2418.
Id.
See supra text accompanying notes 28, 35.
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employment” because of an individual’s race, gender, or religion.177
Describing section 704(a) as a “complementary and closely related provision,”
he pointed to that section’s language forbidding an employer “to discriminate
against any of his employees” for participating in an activity protected by Title
VII.178 He identified two possible interpretations of the term “discriminate
against.”
Under one interpretation, if section 704(a) is read by itself, “discriminate
against” takes its literal meaning, “to treat differently.”179 This interpretation
provides more protection for victims of retaliation than for victims of
discrimination based on race, gender, religion, or natural origin, those persons
Title VII was primarily enacted to protect.180 Moreover, this interpretation
“makes a federal case” out of any distinction in the treatment of an employee
who has participated in a protected activity.181 A plaintiff could establish a
prima facie case of retaliation by showing he was treated in a “less friendly
manner” or subjected to more supervision after filing a discrimination
charge.182 The majority in Burlington rejected this interpretation of section
704(a) and found that the anti-retaliation provision does not protect against all
types of retaliation, stating that “[a]n employee’s decision to report
discriminatory behavior cannot immunize that employee from those petty
slights or minor annoyances that often take place at work and that all
employees experience.”183
The other possible interpretation of “discriminate against” reads sections
703(a) and 704(a) together so that discrimination in both sections means
discrimination “with respect to . . . compensation, terms, conditions, or
privileges of employment.”184 Justice Alito believed that this is the most
reasonable reading of the statute, although he conceded it is less
straightforward.185 The majority, however, also rejected this interpretation,
finding that it denies a remedy to employees who suffered retaliation outside
the workplace.186 Justice Alito argued that “the majority’s concern is
misplaced”187 for several reasons. First, an employee is much more likely to
suffer retaliation on the job where the employer has the most opportunity to

177. Burlington, 126 S. Ct. at 2418 n.1 (Alito, J., concurring) (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 2000e2(a)(1)) (emphasis in original).
178. Id. (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3(a)) (emphasis in original).
179. Id.
180. Id. at 2418–19.
181. Id. at 2419.
182. Burlington, ___ U.S. ___, 126 S. Ct. 2405, 2419 (2006) (Alito, J., concurring).
183. Id. at 2415 (majority opinion).
184. Id. at 2419 (Alito, J., concurring) (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1)).
185. Id.
186. See supra notes 150–53 and accompanying text.
187. Burlington, 126 S. Ct. at 2419 (Alito, J., concurring).
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retaliate.188 Furthermore, many retaliatory acts outside the workplace are
already prohibited under criminal or tort law,189 as in the Berry v. Stevinson
Chevrolet case cited by the majority in which an employer filed false criminal
charges against an employee.190 In any case, the materially adverse action test
is not limited to retaliation that takes place at the workplace, but extends to
action affecting any term, condition, or privilege of employment.191 For
example, Justice Alito pointed to the Rochon v. Gonzales case also cited by the
majority, in which an FBI agent claimed that the Bureau retaliated against him
by denying him off-duty security that would otherwise be provided. 192 In that
case, off-duty security qualifies as a privilege of employment under Justice
Alito’s interpretation, and the agent would have a remedy under Title VII.193
However, as stated above, the majority rejected both of these
interpretations and instead found that section 704(a) did not provide a remedy
for all retaliatory differences in treatment, but only those that “well might have
dissuaded a reasonable worker from making or supporting a charge of
discrimination.”194 In refusing to adopt either a strict literal reading of section
704(a) which would apply to all differences in treatment or a reading which
incorporates the limits of section 703(a), the majority rejected both
interpretations of the statutory language that Justice Alito deemed
reasonable.195
2.

The Practical Application Argument

Justice Alito also argued that the “perverse” practical consequences of the
majority’s test are inconsistent with the purpose of Title VII and thus that the
majority’s interpretation is not what Congress intended.196 Justice Alito broke
down the majority’s standard, turning first to the phrase “a charge of
discrimination” and finding that it must refer to the particular charge which
caused the employer to retaliate against the plaintiff, and not to some generic
or average claim.197 Justice Alito maintained that requiring the jury to consider
a generic charge would be unworkable; the jury must consider the severity of
the underlying discrimination in order to weigh the costs and benefits of filing
a charge, as required by the majority’s standard.198 Thus, the nature of the

188.
189.
190.
191.
192.
193.
194.
195.
196.
197.
198.

Id.
Id.
See supra notes 156–57 and accompanying text.
See Burlington, 126 S. Ct. at 2420 (Alito, J., concurring).
See supra notes 155, 157 and accompanying text.
Burlington, 126 S. Ct. at 2420 (Alito, J., concurring).
Id. (quoting majority opinion at 2415).
Id. at 2418–19.
Id. at 2420.
Id. (emphasis in original).
Burlington, 126 S. Ct. at 2420 n.2 (Alito, J., concurring).
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underlying discrimination charge will determine whether the challenged
conduct would dissuade a reasonable employee in the plaintiff’s position from
filing that particular charge.199 Justice Alito believed that this test would have
“perverse results,” as the “degree of protection afforded to a victim of
retaliation is inversely proportional to the severity of the original act of
discrimination . . . .”200 If a reasonable employee suffers the most severe
discrimination, even very severe acts of retaliation will not deter her from
filing a discrimination charge.201 In contrast, for an employee who suffers a
mild form of discrimination, the possibility of milder retaliation will more
easily dissuade her from complaining.202 To Justice Alito, “[t]hese topsy-turvy
results make no sense.”203
Justice Alito turned next to the majority’s “reasonable worker” standard
and found that it was unclear and subjective.204 At first, the majority described
the test as objective, but then indicated that certain individual characteristics of
the retaliation plaintiff must be considered.205 Justice Alito restated the
majority test as “whether the act well might dissuade a reasonable worker who
shares at least some individual characteristics with the actual victim.”206 In the
majority’s examples, Justice Alito found three such characteristics—age,
gender, and family responsibilities—but the majority did not indicate which
additional characteristics are significant or how courts should determine
whether a characteristic is relevant.207
Finally, Justice Alito took issue with the majority’s “loose and unfamiliar
causation standard”, which asks whether the challenged action “well might
have dissuaded a reasonable worker” from engaging in a protected activity.208
Justice Alito stated that especially in employment discrimination and
retaliation law, “in which standards of causation are already complex, the
introduction of this new and unclear standard is unwelcome.”209
Justice Alito argued that, unlike the majority’s standard, his interpretation
of section 704(a) provides a clear, objective standard that will protect
employees who have suffered real retaliation while preventing trivial claims

199. Id. at 2420–21.
200. Id. at 2420.
201. Id. at 2421.
202. Id.
203. Burlington, 126 S. Ct. at 2421 (Alito, J., concurring).
204. Id.
205. Id.; see supra notes 165–67 and accompanying text.
206. Burlington, 126 S. Ct. at 2421 (Alito, J., concurring).
207. Id.; supra note 167 and accompanying text.
208. Burlington, 126 S. Ct. at 2421 (Alito, J., concurring) (citing majority opinion at 2415)
(emphasis in original).
209. Id.
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from surviving summary judgment.210 He therefore agreed with the circuits
that required a materially adverse employment action,211 meaning “a
significant change in employment status, such as hiring, firing, failing to
promote, reassignment with significantly different responsibilities, or a
Believing this
decision causing a significant change in benefits.”212
interpretation to be consistent with the statutory language and the purpose of
Title VII, Justice Alito concluded that section 704(a) covers only those
discriminatory acts prohibited under section 703(a).213 Applying this standard
to Sheila White’s claims against Burlington, Justice Alito found that both her
reassignment and her suspension were materially adverse actions and therefore
unlawful retaliation.214
III. THE NEW RETALIATION STANDARD
The Supreme Court’s expansion of Title VII’s protection against retaliation
in Burlington came as a surprise to many who did not expect such an
employee-friendly decision from the conservative Roberts Court.215 Employee
rights groups approved of the Court’s decision to adopt such a contextdependent test for retaliation: “Had they given a bright-line rule, it would have
told employers how far they could go and not be liable for it.”216 On the other
side, employers and their attorneys worried about increased litigation and a
confusing standard; as one lawyer put it, “the standard is the reasonable person
in the particular circumstances of the plaintiff, and that makes it difficult to
advise my clients.”217 Burlington’s true impact, however, will not be apparent
until the standard is interpreted in the lower courts and its effects are felt in the
workplace. In any case, however, the soundness of the Court’s standard will
depend on whether it furthers the purposes of Title VII, whether it is judicially
administrable, and whether it appropriately balances the interests of employees
and employers. The following sections evaluate the Court’s standard with

210. Id. at 2419
211. Id. (citing, inter alia, Von Gunten v. Maryland, 243 F.3d 858, 865 (4th Cir. 2001) and
Robinson v. City of Pittsburgh, 120 F.3d 1286, 1300 (3d Cir. 1997)).
212. Id. at 2419 (quoting Ellerth, 524 U.S. 742, 761 (1998)).
213. Burlington, 126 S. Ct. at 2422 (Alito, J., concurring).
214. Id. at 2421–22.
215. See, e.g., Keith Ecker, et al., The Year in Review: 20 Stories That Shook the In-House
Bar, INSIDE COUNSEL, Dec. 2006, at 58; Debra S. Katz & Lisa J. Banks, Victories for Workers,
NAT’L L.J., Aug. 2, 2006, at 10.
216. Supreme Court Ruling on Bias Retaliation Creates “Reasonable Employee” Standard,
26 Empl. Discrim. Rep. (BNA) 786, 787–88 (June 28, 2006) (quoting attorney Stephen Chertkof,
whose firm filed an amicus brief on behalf of the National Employment Lawyers Association).
217. Id. at 787 (quoting attorney Allan H. Weitzman, who filed an amicus brief on behalf of
the National Federation of Independent Business Legal Foundation).
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respect to those inquiries, followed by a brief discussion of the importance of
protection against retaliation.
A.

The Majority’s Retaliation Standard Contravenes the Purpose of Title VII

To begin, the majority’s interpretation of Title VII does not comport with
the language of the statute or principles of statutory construction.218 Courts
agree that the “discriminate against” language in section 704(a) is somewhat
ambiguous; all the standards recognized some limit on what type of retaliatory
conduct is actionable.219 As a general rule of construction, ambiguous statutory
language “must be read in the context of other laws pertaining to the same
subject matter and should be interpreted in the manner which is most
reasonable and logical in light of the aims and designs of the total body of law
of which it is a part.”220 Thus, section 704(a) should be interpreted
consistently with the other anti-discrimination provisions of Title VII and
likewise limited to discrimination affecting employment. This interpretation is
the most reasonable in light of Title VII’s purpose of preventing harm and
primarily protecting victims of status-based discrimination.221 Rather than
harmonizing the two discrimination provisions of Title VII, the majority in
Burlington held that the two sections had entirely different purposes and
refused to read them together.222 In this way, as Justice Alito argued, the
Supreme Court derived a retaliation standard with no grounding in the
statutory language of Title VII.223
Furthermore, the standard directly conflicts with the primary purpose of
Title VII by granting more protection to victims of retaliation than victims of
discrimination based on race, gender, religion, or national origin. Title VII
was enacted in response to “glaring” discrimination against minorities who
were denied the “rights, privileges, and opportunities which are considered to
be, and must be, the birthright of all citizens.”224 The right to equal
employment opportunities is a fundamental right which “must be, the birthright
of all citizens”; the right to seek a remedy under section 704(a) is not. In
addition, the framers of Title VII intended to encourage voluntary, informal
resolution of discrimination complaints in all but the most serious forms of
discrimination.225 The Supreme Court’s easily-met standard discourages

218.
219.
220.
221.
222.
223.
224.
225.

See supra notes 176–95 and accompanying text.
See supra Part II.B.
Cohen v. United States, 384 F.2d 1001, 1004 (Ct. Cl. 1967).
See supra Part II.A.
See Burlington, ___ U.S. ___, 126 S. Ct. 2405, 2412 (2006).
See supra notes 176–95 and accompanying text.
H.R. REP. NO. 88-914 (1963), reprinted in 1964 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2391, 2393.
Id.
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informal resolution; plaintiffs have more incentive to file a retaliation claim
seeking compensatory and punitive damages.226
It is true that enforcement of Title VII depends on employees reporting
unlawful practices and “[m]aintaining unfettered access to statutory remedial
mechanisms,”227 so that protection of discrimination plaintiffs is necessary to
guarantee civil rights. The majority’s standard, however, expands protection
beyond victims of real retaliation and therefore does not provide any additional
security for fundamental rights. By focusing only on the subjective deterrent
quality of an employer’s action, the standard recognizes retaliation claims
based on conduct that is harmless or even seemingly advantageous, so long as
the particular plaintiff claims the action was adverse.228 In contrast, the
moderate standard that limits actionable retaliation to conduct affecting
employment incorporates the materiality test of the substantive antidiscrimination provision.229 This test is sufficient to ensure employees
“unfettered access” to Title VII remedies while preventing insignificant claims.
In sum, the statutory language does not support the majority’s standard for
retaliation, and it directly conflicts with the purpose of Title VII by encouraging
litigation and by providing more protection to discrimination claimants than to
discrimination victims. In contrast, Justice Alito’s standard logically interprets
section 704(a) in light of the aims and designs of Title VII by protecting civil
rights and those who enforce those rights to the same degree.
B.

The Majority’s Standard Is Not Judicially Administrable

Although the Court granted certiorari in Burlington to promote uniform
application of the federal law against retaliation, its standard is too unclear and
subjective to do so. Already, the district courts have varied in their application
of the standard. In Gilmore v. Potter, the plaintiff claimed her employer
retaliated against her by telling her she was “worthless,” forbidding her from
speaking to coworkers, and confining her to a small room by threatening to fire
her if she came out into the workroom.230 After finding that the majority’s
“reasonably likely to deter” standard was controlling, the court distinguished
the plaintiff’s facts from those in Burlington: White had presented considerable
evidence that her reassignment was “more arduous and dirtier,” less
prestigious, and objectively considered a demotion.231 However, the court in

226. See supra notes 6–7 and accompanying text (highlighting the increase in Title VII
retaliation claims).
227. Burlington, 126 S. Ct. at 2407 (quoting Robinson v. Shell Oil Co., 519 U.S. 337, 346
(1997)).
228. See Glover, supra note 49, at 582–83.
229. See supra notes 63–70 and accompanying text.
230. No. 4:04-CV-1264 GTE, 2006 WL 3235088, at *10 (E.D. Ark. 2006).
231. Id. at *9–10 (citing Burlington, 126 S. Ct. at 2415–16).
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Gilmore went on to apply a version of the adverse employment action test, first
finding that the plaintiff had not suffered any loss of pay or benefits.232 The
court then concluded that no jury could reasonably find that the employer’s
actions “constituted an adverse employment action” and granted the
employer’s summary judgment motion.233
The court in Reis v. Universal City Development Partners, Ltd., similarly
declined to consider the perspective of a reasonable employee in the plaintiff’s
position.234 Although the court found Burlington to be controlling, it applied
the standard articulated by the Eleventh Circuit in Doe v. Dekalb County
School District,235 because it found “no appreciable difference” in the two
standards.236 The court chose to apply the Doe test, however, because it
“subsumed a requirement of materiality within its reasonable person standard
for adversity.”237
These two cases illustrate that the majority’s test for retaliation is too
subjective for lower courts to apply without referring to another, now obsolete,
standard; as the primary finders of fact, the district courts need a clear
retaliation standard with an objective test for materiality. So far, the federal
appellate courts have applied the majority’s standard consistently with
Burlington.238 However, as of yet, courts have not attempted to determine
which individual characteristics of a retaliation plaintiff are relevant; resolution
of this issue will likely vary throughout the circuits.239 In addition, if the lower
courts continue to deviate from the majority’s standard out of necessity, the
inconsistencies will eventually be replicated in the appellate courts. If the
Supreme Court wants to ensure uniform application of the law of retaliation, it
will need to articulate a clear, objective test that district courts can apply
directly to concrete facts.
C. Are the Benefits of Broad Protection Against Retaliation Worth the Cost?
The majority’s broad interpretation of Title VII’s protection against
retaliation benefits plaintiffs more than employees; this standard makes it
easier for plaintiffs to prove retaliation, but does not meaningfully increase

232. Id. at *10.
233. Id. at *10.
234. 442 F. Supp. 2d 1238, 1253 (M.D. Fla. 2006) (Though the court does find it “cannot say
that a reasonable person would have found the denial of the request to transfer to be materially
adverse.”).
235. 145 F.3d 1441, 1448–49 (11th Cir. 1998) (“An ADA plaintiff must demonstrate that a
reasonable person in his position would view the employment action in question as adverse.”).
236. Reis, 442 F. Supp. 2d at 1253.
237. Id. (citations omitted)
238. See, e.g., Carmona-Rivera v. Puerto Rico, 464 F.3d 14, 19–20 (1st Cir. 2006); Argo v.
Blue Cross and Blue Shield of Kan., Inc., 452 F.3d 1193, 1202–03 (10th Cir. 2006).
239. See supra notes 203–05 and accompanying text.
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protection for employees.240 In fact, the standard increases uncertainty and
employer liability under Title VII, a cost that may be revisited upon the
employees. Already, the average cost of defending against an employment
discrimination claim is $250,000.241 This cost will have the largest impact on
small businesses that are less likely to have employment practices insurance.242
Moreover, the number of claims against small businesses has risen while
claims against large corporations have dropped, most likely because big
corporations can utilize counsel and human resource departments to follow the
“minutiae of employment law.”243 In any case, the majority’s standard for
retaliation confuses experienced employment lawyers, making it difficult even
for large corporations to prevent liability under the new test.
Ultimately, employees will pay for this increased employer liability.
Employers must now devote more resources to defending lawsuits and
compensating retaliation plaintiffs; as a result, both employee wages and
company profits will suffer.244 Businesses will be forced to hire fewer
employees and may subject applicants to more thorough evaluations or even
unlawful discrimination to prevent potential claimants from being hired,
resulting in a less fluid job market. On the whole, employees may find that the
unpredictable, context-dependent definition of retaliation results in fewer
employment options and less desirable employment practices than the more
moderate standard.
D. Preventing Retaliation is Essential to Preventing Discrimination
The enforcement of Title VII and all statutes seeking to eradicate
discrimination depend on individuals being willing to come forward and report
discrimination. If the law against retaliation is not enforced, individuals will
not come forward, and the law against discrimination will also be un-enforced.
Retaliatory conduct serves to punish those who enforce their civil rights and to
threaten others into remaining silent.245
Those most vulnerable to
discrimination, like women and minorities, are most likely to refrain from
filing a discrimination claim out of fear of retaliation.246 In recognition of the
importance of preventing retaliation, the Supreme Court in Burlington refused

240. See supra notes 224–29 and accompanying text.
241. Jeff St. John, Insurance Helps Protect Against Suits, TRI-CITY HERALD (Kennewick,
Wash.), Mar. 2, 2006, at B6, available at http://www.tri-cityherald.com/tch/business/story/
7492846p-7402962c.html.
242. See id.
243. Id.
244. See Timothy D. Terrell, In Defense of Firing, 19 FREE MARKET 1, 1 (Mar. 2001),
available at http://www.mises.org/freemarket_detail.asp?control=343&sortorder=articledate.
245. See Brake, supra note 38, at 20.
246. See id. at 32–42 (discussing sociological studies).
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to limit its scope to conduct affecting employment.247 Those who agree with
the majority’s standard argue that such a subjective standard for retaliation is
necessary; the objective, privileged perspective of a judge is irrelevant in
evaluating the harms caused by retaliation.248
That argument fails to recognize, however, that the more moderate
standard adopted by Justice Alito constitutes a total incorporation of all
substantive discrimination law.249 The requirement of a tangible employment
action involves a consideration of the totality of the circumstances; for
example, in White II, the court held that a lateral job transfer was actionable
retaliation under those specific conditions.250 The court applying the moderate
standard to determining whether a hostile work environment constitutes
actionable retaliation would also consider the unique circumstances, including
characteristics of the plaintiff.251 Furthermore, as Justice Alito pointed out,
retaliatory conduct serious enough to deter an employee from filing a
discrimination claim will almost always have some effect on the conditions of
employment, or is already unlawful.252 Retaliatory conduct is in part a threat
to other employees to prevent them from reporting discrimination;253
employers have much less motivation to retaliate against an employee in some
private setting. The moderate standard is, thus, effective in preventing
retaliation and, by incorporating the discrimination precedent, provides courts
and employers with clear guidelines.
CONCLUSION

In Burlington v. White, the Supreme Court articulated a broad, uncertain
standard for retaliation, expanding the scope of Title VII further than the
framers of the Civil Rights Act intended and leaving district courts and
employers without clear guidance. The Court’s interpretation provides more
protection to those who file discrimination claims than to those who suffer
discrimination. In addition, the standard’s ambiguities are likely to result in
inconsistent application throughout the circuits. As Justice Alito asserted in
his concurrence, the Court should have adopted instead the same standard for
retaliation as it applies to substantive discrimination claims. This moderate
standard is grounded in the language of the statute, strikes a just balance

247. See Burlington, ___ U.S. ___, 126 S. Ct. 2405, 2407 (2006).
248. See Brake, supra note 38, at 98–99.
249. See Burlington, 126 S. Ct. at 2419 (Alito, J., concurring); supra notes 173–212 and
accompanying text.
250. White II, 364 F.3d 789, 803 (6th Cir. 2004).
251. See, e.g., Richardson v. N.Y. State Dep’t of Corr. Servs., 180 F.3d 426, 446 (2d Cir.
1999).
252. See supra notes 184–95 and accompanying text.
253. See Brake, supra note 38, at 19.

SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW

2008]

PROVING RETALIATION AFTER BURLINGTON v. WHITE

1247

between the interests of employers and employees, and still provides unfettered
access to the remedies of Title VII. Furthermore, adoption of the moderate
standard would finally resolve the circuit split: Its consistent application by
district courts to substantive discrimination law demonstrates that the standard
is judicially administrable and capable of uniform interpretation. Most
importantly, the moderate standard enforces equal rights through protecting all
victims of discrimination equally, thereby, serving the purpose of the Civil
Rights Act.
The Civil Rights Act was enacted to prevent discrimination based on race,
gender, or religion, not to provide compensation for the victims of
discrimination. The standard announced in Bulington v. White contravenes the
Act’s prospective purpose; it will have the greatest effect in litigation contexts
by providing retaliation plaintiffs a better chance at recovery while failing to
provide clear guidance for employers seeking to avoid retaliatory conduct.
Discriminatory conduct by an employer should be held to violate Title VII if
the conduct is related to employment, whether the plaintiff is alleging statusbased discrimination or retaliation. Title VII guarantees the right to equal
employment opportunities and should provide equal opportunities to victims of
discrimination to enforce that right, regardless of the basis for that
discrimination.
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